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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
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Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
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PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 




























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE 
FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Border Regimes and Security 
in an Enlarged European Community Police 
Co-operation with CEECs:
Between Trust and Obligation
D id ie r  b ig o
CERI
EU! Working Paper RSC No. 2000/65 




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© 2000 Didier Bigo 
Printed in Italy in December 2000 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Programme on Eastern Europe
The Working Papers series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European 
Union in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of 
attention. The scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two 
areas of research have been prioritized:
1/ The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications 
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe 
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme, as 
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written within the project on The Eastward Enlargement of the 
European Union: the Cases of the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
which was set up by the Robert Schuman Centre through the support of the 
Academy of Finland. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 
Europe at the Robert Schuman Centre, please contact Professor Jan Zielonka 




























































































Policing by network, policing by remote control: these are the new forms of 
control and surveillance in European societies. They presuppose numerous 
changes: in targets, technology, control points and conceptions of security. 
These changes are exported towards the CEECs, but often without a clear 
understanding of the norms and interests which are at stake. The official 
discussions give rise to myths concerning the security deficit, a global mafia 
threat, and efficiency of the external border controls through the Schengen 
information system. They bring with them the belief in an homogeneous internal 
area without border checks and a strong external border even though the actual 
practices of policing show the contrary. External border controls are weak but a 
lot of internal controls continue to exist, even if they are privatised or 
delocalised. Controls have also already been launched in the countries on the 
periphery of the European Union by the strategy of policing by network and 
surveillance at a distance.
Before we can understand the effects on the CEECs of these new forms of 
policing it is necessary to describe them and their effects on the EU countries. In 
a nutshell, the activities of police forces, whether they are initiated by home 
affairs or justice departments, have been extended along two lines. First, the 
extension of police activities reaches beyond national borders, namely by the 
establishment of interconnections between the different countries. Second, new 
forms of control have considerably extended the sphere of police activity beyond 
crime control. The term "internal security" or "internal affairs" in use throughout 
Europe is an indicator of this double extension which is both geographical 
(through increased European cooperation) and structural (in the light of the new 
tasks assigned to the different security agencies).
The geographical extension and the consequent redefinition of spheres of 
competence have been much discussed, especially the causal link between 
economic globalisation, the increase in crime and the need to create a European 
police authority. Europe is presented alternatively as a "sieve" or as a "fortress" 
by those wishing to stress either the need to strengthen controls or the dangers to 
individual liberties brought about by strengthening of controls. However, the 
debate concerning fortress Europe has little point given that there can be no 
control of land borders in Europe without changing the whole economic and 
political system (Bigo Le Monde Diplomatique Octobre 1996). Thus, the 
practical implications of the theoretical transfer of internal border controls to the 
external borders of Europe have not been correctly assessed. Preoccupation with 
geographical extension has meant that there has been little discussion about the 



























































































control of transnational flows of people and the security aspects of immigration 
and even human rights.
The label "internal security" at the EU level has, however, created a new 
definition of police activities in all the different countries. It has carved out, 
through the numerous police activities of each European country with their 
strong individual differences, a common basis for action in the fields of 
terrorism, drug trafficking, and organised crime, which excludes some of the 
specificities of each country, but adds the common task of border surveillance 
and immigration controls. Within the European Community, legislation and the 
political debates concerning internal security have resulted in the Trevi informal 
agreement, Schengen Convention and Maastricht. They have created a 
continuum of internal affairs which include: the fight against terrorism and drug­
trafficking, domestic and international organised crime, and illegal immigration 
as well as the surveillance of cross-border movements (migrants, asylum- 
seekers, travellers). The latter even stretches to persons who do not conform to 
the law-enforcers' image of "normal" national identity (e.g., young people of 
immigrant extraction, minority groups, etc.). Even if Amsterdam and Tampere, 
by distinguishing between first and third pillar activities, have the effect of 
removing the link between asylum, migration and cross border activities, on the 
one hand and crime control on the other, it seems that the Commission still has 
difficulty in creating an alternative debate to that of the “necessity” of 
compensatory measures with regard to freedom of movement.
This debate on compensatory measures and security deficit created by the 
opening of the internal borders is one of the strongest myths of EU self­
presentation. It is argued that the very nature of criminal activities - or what are 
claimed to be such - has rapidly evolved in the last 30 years, providing the 
explanation for the changes within police forces. Drug trafficking, cross border 
crimes, the globalisation of terrorism and mafia activities are always quoted to 
explain the transnationalisation of the police and the development of police 
networks at the European level. However, even if there is some truth in the idea 
that police forces seek to adapt constantly to what they perceive, or what is 
presented to them, as an objective threat (terrorism, mafia, organised crime), 
there are doubtless other reasons for this europeanisation of police activity. The 
most important of these reasons are:
• first, the struggle between and within various bureaucracies and 
services (police, customs, secret services, armed forces), and their 
competition for budgets and legitimacy. This obliges them to find 
more and more “European partners sharing the same vision” 
concerning the nature of the threat in order to impose their point of 



























































































• second, the move towards larger budgets for technological surveillance 
at a distance (information technology, satellites, non lethal weapons, 
etc.).
Leaving behind the debates of politicians on why the security deficit calls for 
europeanisation, we need to understand how the process of convergence and 
conflicts between the different official or private agencies of any one country 
and those between all or any of these agencies of another country leads to 
networks of policing around questions concerning the practices of surveillance: 
how to check, codify, classify, identify or categorise population movements and 
how to organise them; how to deter them from choosing the European territory 
as a point of arrival; how to exercise mobile surveillance adapted to these 
movements; how, if these populations cannot be massively expelled, to stabilise 
and normalise them ?
This is the type of knowledge that they share and exchange. It is often 
very technical and far removed from the rhetoric concerning rule of law in 
policing or democratic and community based policing. Each agency (the 
different national police forces, customs officers, immigration services, the 
diplomatic service and even the armed forces) presents its own solutions and 
considers itself as the more competent. However, this extension of activity, 
which favours a new conception of surveillance, especially benefits the interior 
ministries and ministries which are responsible for police with military status or 
border guards, in so far as they have established, in parallel with this extension, 
a network of relationships between officials responsible for European police co­
operation. This gives them an excellent awareness of the situation existing 
beyond their own borders. The result is to confer considerable expertise in 
foreign affairs on such ministries - one might even speak of an 
"internationalisation" of home affairs departments. This process occurs to the 
detriment of social ministries (Health and Employment) or specialised ministries 
such as European Affairs. As a result, the spheres of activity of internal security 
ministries overlap those of ministries such as Foreign or European Affairs which 
have international responsibilities. Thus the former do not hesitate to take 
initiatives in the fields of immigration or foreign policy when the policies in 
question can have repercussions on internal security. They become essential 
counterparts of the leaders of countries generating strong emigrant flows or 
intervene directly when these countries are undergoing a political crisis. 
Conventional distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs thus lose their 
significance. Traditional points of reference and conventional delimitations 
between spheres of bureaucratic activity have been modified. With respect to the 
CEECs, it is important to understand the pre-eminence of interior and even 




























































































This is not a temporary phenomenon. On the contrary, it is possible to 
determine the long-term tendencies of this extension of the functions of the 
police beyond national frontiers and into new forms of surveillance within our 
societies. These tendencies are not all linked to European construction, but result 
also from the evolution of the means of controlling international flows of goods, 
capital, information and persons as well as infighting within the security 
agencies. There is a progressive movement away from methods of surveillance 
established by nation-states, such as national identity cards and border controls 
of foreign citizens. In the 1970s, the security agencies began to establish 
interconnecting systems in order to create a worldwide network based on 
computer records, on the presence of liaison officers in foreign countries and on 
close European collaboration. The connections made by agencies and politicians 
at the EU level -  following the example of the US - between terrorism, drugs, 
crime, delinquency, border surveillance, the fight against major trafficking, and 
control of illegal immigration widen the spectrum of public security to 
encompass different activities. Information and military activities to counter 
clandestine organisations from abroad, which use political violence against 
national citizens or which use the national territory as a transit zone or for the 
sale of drugs, usually fall into the domain of customs officers (border controls, 
the fight against trafficking, economic intelligence, etc.). They find themselves 
drawn into internal security and surveillance activities which are increasingly 
delegated to private operators on a local scale. The connection is stronger when 
the different agencies employ the same technologies and know-how 
(fingerprinting, unforgeable ID’s, computerised tracking of entrance, residence, 
accommodation and exit, setting up expert IT systems, satellite surveillance, 
widespread data-stocking, etc.). The price of this new method of policing which 
is less concerned with territorial surveillance has been looser and less systematic 
attention to individual surveillance. The result for the great majority of people 
has been greater freedom of circulation within Europe. However, the prior 
designation of groups requiring closer surveillance, such as immigrants or ethnic 
minorities, has introduced an element of discrimination, especially since these 
groups are not the only potentially-criminal ones. The overlap between crime 
control and immigration control has modified the whole rationale and 
effectiveness of surveillance as well as causing a violent reaction from groups 
targeted for special surveillance. It involves more and more military technology 
and proactive surveillance from the secret services and diminishes the role of 
criminal or judicial police. At any time, however, the thrust of these new 
conceptions of surveillance can be altered in the interests of the different 
politicians in each country. Nothing is stabilised but there is a strong tendency to 



























































































In brief, policing is now carried out using networks. There are networks of 
administrative bodies in which customs officers, immigration offices, consulates 
and even private transport companies and private security companies join forces 
with national and local police forces. There are networks of information 
technology based on the creation of national or European data files on wanted or 
missing persons, on those who have been denied residence, expelled, turned 
back at the frontier or refused asylum ( SIS, Interpol and Europol files). There 
are networks of liaison officers who have been sent abroad to represent their 
governments and enable information exchange as well as networks of semantics 
in which new doctrines and new concepts on conflict and political violence are 
developed. Remote policing is ever more pervasive with work done outside the 
national territory and with the help of technology. Security checks are no longer 
necessarily done at the border on a systematic and egalitarian basis, but can be 
carried out further downstream, within the territory, within the border zone or 
even upstream with police collaboration in the immigrants’ home country, 
through visa-granting systems and through readmission agreements.
From this perspective, the purpose of this article is to formulate a series of 
preliminary questions on the underlying principles governing control in a 
Europe that includes Central and East European countries (CEECs), and to do so 
by focussing the research on police co-operation. It will consider both practical 
methods and the probable consequences of control. This article is based on the 
sparse documentation available in this particular field and is supplemented by 
three months’ worth of conversations and e-mails with a score of police and 
military chiefs from both EU member states (France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece) and some of the countries 
in the first wave of EU enlargement (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Estonia -  I have no information from Slovenia, Cyprus or Malta). Thus it is not 
so much a description of current relations between the EU and the CEECs as a 
preliminary study of the implications for the implementation of the third pillar in 
a 20-member European Union.
My intention is to identify the perceptions of those involved in co­
operation on a daily basis in order to highlight a series of problems that are often 
overlooked, even though they affect co-operation practices. Such problems 
include mutual trust (or lack of it), corruption, markets and state interests, as 
well as the ambiguity of objectives concerning the link made between 
transborder crime and population flows. The legal complexity of the issues 
raised by the post-Amsterdam third pillar (shared Commission and Council 
competencies, the status of Europol, the Schengen acquis, etc.) has tended to 
overshadow other concerns. Indeed, the actual purpose and legitimacy of 
setting-up police and legal collaboration is often simply forgotten in the eager 




























































































according to its implications for relations between the Commission and the 
Council, for community and intergovernmental considerations, for the balance 
between the pillars and quarrels over areas of competence. However, it may also 
be useful to look at the substance of the co-operation, at the sociological profile 
of the actors involved, at the legitimacy of such an evolution. Even a rather 
fragmentary analysis of the relevant actors’ norms, ideas and interests may 
enable us to pose other questions. These are not without interest, even though 
they are less Euro-centric and not so directly tied to the current legal debate.
In order to do so, I will begin by describing the various forms of police 
co-operation with CEECs and their purpose. I will try to show the importance of 
direct contacts between police officers from EU countries and acceding 
countries and emphasize the informal nature of this co-operation. I will consider 
the interests of the different security industries and how the zones of influence 
that western governments want to create are related to the implementation of the 
third pillar and are not confined to matters relating to the second pillar. I will 
show how institutional co-operation raises a contradiction between the 
objectives of crime prevention and the objectives of the prevention of 
immigration and mass population flows.
At the heart of this contradiction lies the right to freedom of movement, 
on the one hand and the devices of control related to the shifting Schengen 
borders, on the other. Enlargement upsets the already precarious balance 
between freedom of movement and security. It uncovers the extent to which we 
are dependent on the myths we propagate and the fears we have (Paul Veyne).
What are we really trying to export to CEECs? Our democratic practices, 
our control technologies, or our fears of the Other? Is organised crime a problem 
in itself or is it being used as a pretext for tighter border controls to block 
population flows? What kind of analysis are we carrying out in respect of 
organised crime and what are the consequences of this analysis on the image of 
the political structures of the countries in which that crime is able to develop? 
To what extent can one have confidence in CEE police forces and to what extent 
is this mutual? Is there not an attempt to deflect the basic contradictions in 
respect of population flow management onto the new entrants, the CEECs which 
will be in charge of a large part of the new external borders of the EU? No 
amount of militarised technology can solve these problems. We must reconsider 




























































































I. Police Co-operation with the CEECs: Between Trust and Obligations 
1. Current methods of police co-operation
There are three different types of police co-operation, each posing its own 
particular problems: operational, technical and training, and institutional. These 
three types of co-operation already exist among EU member countries.
-  The first type dates back to the creation of national police forces. It is 
often bilateral and, with the creation of the Trevi group, the Palma agreement 
and the negotiations for the Schengen convention, it has found a new lease of 
life in the prevention of terrorism and drugs trafficking as well as in border 
control. This modern form of operational co-operation dates back to 1984-1986. 
Since then, Europeanization has emerged as the forum for co-operation, 
overshadowing both transatlantic and world-wide co-operation, and weakening 
governments’ sovereign standpoints on national police forces. Co-operation at 
European level is now accepted, although some are sceptical about its actual 
impact (interviews).
Policing methods within these specialised fields have been transformed by 
informal contacts between European police officers, by the creation of liaison 
officers and later of police attachés to reinforce co-operation, and by the 
installation of computer systems that can be connected up only via trusted 
human intermediaries. There is new know-how based on exchanges of 
experiences, and it is considered to be an integral part of any modern democratic 
police force (Bigo 1996).
-  The second form of co-operation has also existed for some time, but it 
has been more important for relations between EU police forces and their ex­
colonies or certain Third World countries (in the 1960s for France and the 
United Kingdom, much more recently for Germany) than between EU states. 
The aim of this technical assistance and training co-operation is to extend one’s 
zone of influence in equipment, technology or specific know-how (French-style 
peacekeeping, English-style community policing, German information 
technology, Italian anti-Mafia methods). There is no convergence towards a 
unique European police model. Each country clings to its own particularity and 
tries to promote this abroad as being the best model. Indeed, the acceptance by a 
CEEC of a particular model is used as an argument for its wider implementation 
inside the actual EU. The end of bipolarity opened up the CEECs to this 
particular “training market” in their search for other policing models.
-  The third form of co-operation requires acceding countries to accept a 
number of principles or norms that are both non-negotiable and a condition of 




























































































presupposes uniform application within the Union which future member states 
would also have to accept. But internal differences undermine the credibility of 
the notion that there is uniform application, despite the fact that all discourse on 
institutional co-operation appears to suggest the contrary.
2. Operational Co-operation: the Importance of Mutual Confidence
Operational co-operation with CEECs is not a new phenomenon. Even during 
the Cold War, criminal investigations officers were occasionally known to co­
operate, and since 1992 there have been bilateral exchanges of know-how and 
technology. In France this co-operation has been channelled through the SCTIP 
(police department for international technical co-operation) which at the time 
created a division for co-operation with eastern European countries. In Germany 
this co-operation is carried out through the BKA, the BGS or regional 
transborder police.
-  EU member states prefer to act individually and maintain bilateral 
relations with CEECs. In France, numerous visits and contacts led in 1994 to 
collaboration with the new CEEC chiefs of police (particularly with the police 
forces of Poland and the Czech Republic, held to be more respectable than their 
Romanian or Ukrainian counterparts). France has sent specialists from narcotics 
and organised crime divisions, making sure not to recruit from the DST or the 
RG. The French have emphasized their operational techniques in the fight 
against serious crime and drugs. Liaison officers have been sent to CEECs since 
1994, followed by police attachés in 1997. Despite being limited by the small 
number of police officers who speak the languages of these countries, this co­
operation is on the increase and the SCTIP has recently taken over the 
management of the various embassy attachés (BlGO 1998, ENSCHEDE’s article in 
Sheptycki, Brogden and Shearing). The aim is to increase information 
exchange, to co-operate on controlled deliveries and undercover surveillance, 
and to demonstrate the efficiency of French crime-fighting techniques.
Germany is undoubtedly the country which has invested the most money 
and men in operational co-operation with the CEECs, followed by France and 
the United Kingdom. Austria invests substantial efforts bearing in mind its size 
and capacity. The CEECs try to maintain links with all the different European 
police forces, so as not to depend on one single partner. Nevertheless, there are 
marked zones of influence. Poland and the Czech Republic mainly work with 
Germany and the United Kingdom. France is more involved in Romania and is 
trying to get a foothold in Flungary. Austria already has strong links with 
Hungary, and the United States with their FBI Academy also play the Hungarian 



























































































This level of analysis of the member states’ strategies is not sufficient. We 
need to analyse the strategies of different bureaucracies. Very often, in contrast 
to those responsible for foreign affairs, police and security agencies continue to 
prefer bilateral operational and informal co-operation as this allows them to 
build up a relationship with their partners. As was the case in the past when 
there were twelve member countries, police officers in the field are increasing 
the number of informal contacts and have little faith in the EU’s legal norms and 
the political texts signed by their states. Some officers, at ground level, even fear 
that Europol will use these texts to claim the right to define EU interests in 
police co-operation, thus trying to replace bilateral co-operation by an 
homogeneous network under its own control. According to various interviews 
with policemen from both the EU and CEECs, Europol is seen as the by-product 
of German ambitions on the grounds that its director is of German nationality.
-  Although CEEC police forces do not have direct access to SIS or 
Europol, they can often get hold of information. Through informal exchanges 
with police officers who do have access to these computers and because they 
themselves are particularly good at providing information on drugs routes, they 
can ask for counterpart information. Nevertheless, CEEC police forces complain 
of the lack of western reciprocity and express regret at not having enough liaison 
officers in western countries. Apparently Poland is the only country with liaison 
officers in Germany at the level of the border Länder. Elsewhere, bilateral co­
operation has yet to deliver, and CEEC governments complain of the imbalance 
between the number of EU police officers on their territory and the number of 
their own representatives (police officers or diplomats) invited to EU countries.
-  With respect to relations with international police organisations, it 
should be pointed out that the success attributed to Europol in the discovery of 
the “Balkan road for drug trafficking” is due to the exchange of information 
with CEEC police forces. Nevertheless Europol is limited by its mandate, and 
the sensitivity of its data makes it loath to share information. Some governments 
or police chiefs do not want to commit themselves too far in their co-operation 
with the CEECs.
Interpol, in contrast, has been quick to open its doors to CEEC police 
officers to exploit its comparative advantage vis-à-vis Europol. This 
organisation uses its worldwide structure to build strong links with Russian and 
CEEC police forces in the hope of becoming the hub of information exchange, 
over and above Europol.
-  Operational co-operation among police officers does well when the 
police officers trust each other and when they are dealing with specific criminal 




























































































multilateral levels. However, with regard to the immigration and anti-terrorism 
police squads, as well as with respect to problems of minorities relations, the 
subjects tend to be more political. They often rise above the police level to 
involve diplomatic channels and governments exchanges.
3. Technical Assistance and Training, the Importance of Models of 
Influence and Competition Between States
Technical assistance is based on training sessions, contact between police (or 
customs or military police) academies, and radio contact in transborder 
operations. Politicians are involved to an extent but implementation is basically 
a police matter.
There are two types of training sessions; sessions whose aim is to provide 
an institutional framework and promote a certain concept of the rule of law, and 
those whose aim is to train CEEC police forces in sophisticated techniques. The 
first type are often held by lawyers with an emphasis on data protection and civil 
liberties. The second type are carried out by police officers and provide training 
on the latest methods for detecting weapons, explosives and drugs or techniques 
to prevent money laundering.
-  With respect to transborder operations, Germany and Austria plan to 
train their neighbours’ police forces and probably to set up joint police stations 
(or police and customs co-operation centres) on the border, as they did on their 
western borders.
-  Clearly there are government strategies involved in both cases. 
Different western police models (and concepts of the rule of law) compete with 
one another. There are economic interests at stake. There are also longer-term 
strategies at work (Shearing). There is competition between German, British 
and French police models and they try to use these training sessions as a vector 
of influence. The intensification of exchanges between national or local police 
academies is a good indicator of how much is at stake. The desire to establish 
democratic norms is not necessarily at issue, but a lucrative trade in security 
technology and a belief in the comparative efficiency of one’s own national 
model can lead to a strong bias. The Americans also have an important role in 
training and influence (Nadelman). The official idea is to transfer norms, 
practical know-how and technology in order to make the police forces of future 
member countries more efficient.
Training sessions are organised bilaterally, at European level, or under the 
auspices of UN CIVPOL operations, aid for transition to democracy and various 




























































































The money to be made from internal security technology (IT equipment, remote 
tracking technology, airport equipment, computerised identity cards) plays no 
small part in co-operation strategy. Western countries and their private or quasi­
public companies compete for this market and sometimes, lessons held by police 
officers for CEEC officers concerning rule of law are transformed into sales 
promotions for their own equipment. Aid is directly linked to sales of equipment 
produced by their companies. Moreover, immigration control and police co­
operation with liaison officer access to sensitive data is linked to acceptance of 
their police models. The fight against organised crime is often a front for 
concern over migration flows and the solution proposed for organised crime, 
namely tighter security on external borders, pulls the wool over the public’s 
eyes. Increased border security reassures the public but it is ineffective in both 
the prevention of crime and the prevention of transnational population flows.
The political rhetoric does not reflect the strategies of the different 
services. Despite declarations that uniform policy is being implemented 
throughout the EU, police models and methods differ substantially between 
countries.
Germany proposes a model of proactive, highly computerised policing 
which relies heavily on strategic analysis. This model is governed by the law 
and the clear-cut division of competencies between its different organisations. 
Unlike the American model, it makes little use of undercover techniques.
France promotes a pragmatic model, which focuses more on operations 
and men than on strategy and intensive use of IT. Its mixed model of national 
and local police is presented as an advantage and they emphasize its possible 
transferability from external security missions to internal ones.
Like Germany and France, Britain is also trying to get into this market 
and uses the reputation of both Scotland Yard and British prevention of 
terrorism (IRA) to promote specific technology and organisational structures. 
Britain often acts in unison with the United States.
There is an intense battle over the development of the organisational 
norms that will dictate CEEC preferences. This threatens to shatter the image of 
a single democratic police model in the EU and also gives the CEEC an 
opportunity to play one EU country off against another. To a lesser degree, other 
western services also try to compete for markets and highlight their specificity 
and their originality: the overthrow of dictatorships and their experience of 
democratic transitions in the case of Spain and Greece, the fight against the 
Mafia in the case of Italy. However, competition is dominated by the main 




























































































(SCTIP) and the United Kingdom (NSIS), and it proliferates in other areas at 
service level by the inclusion of customs, military status police and intelligence 
services or the armed forces. Each service makes the most of its own specificity 
and its comparative advantage, in terms of resources, within a specific “security 
field in Europe” (Bigo 1998)
-  Clearly there is no consensus among EU governments on the content of 
police training sessions nor on the methods of organisation against crime and 
investigation techniques. It would be interesting to put together a comparative 
study of the CEEC police or military training programmes carried out by the 
various EU countries and the US in order to go make a more rigorous analysis of 
the “norms” passed on by these training sessions and in order to identify 
governments’ more indirect strategies. Despite ambitious projects established in 
1995-96, the role of the European Union is not central at this level. The EU has 
not been able to agree on setting up a police academy worthy of the name and up 
to the standards of the American one.
Seminars, however, do take place in Poland and Hungary. The 
Commission has also helped to set up seminars on border control in Strasbourg 
in order to share its experiences, but these seminars are not terribly influential, 
particularly in comparison to bilateral action that focuses on operational 
practices.
-  Such contradictions leave CEEC players in a position of relative 
strength. They can take advantage of the competition among Europeans which is 
made all the stiffer by the strong American presence in the sector (FBI Academy 
in Hungary). As Eberhard Bort points out, the US has invested some 8 million 
dollars in the ILEA (International Law Enforcement Academy) in Budapest. 
This is seen not only as a means to combat crime but also as a way of training 
CEEC police forces in American methods rather than leaving it to the 
Europeans. The Americans are keen to outdo the others and have made this 
training a strategic objective. Hungarian leaders receive this interest with mixed 
feelings. They are clearly sceptical about any help in moving towards 
democracy. They interpret all action by American or European governments as a 
form of neo-colonialism and as a recycling of systems that have already been 
tried out in the Third World and are now being forced onto them.
As is the case with respect to operational co-operation, training co­
operation can easily take place without any institutional agreement and many 
police officers in the field are wary of institutionalisation (EU authorities). They 
are in favour of flexible bilateral relations according to the so-called national 




























































































and foreign affairs officials. They are sceptical about agreements signed at EU 
level.
Some British and French police officers support what, in legal language, 
is described as an “inter-governmental” position, although in fact this is 
basically an expression of their general distrust concerning the judicial and the 
formal agreement (and not simply a distrust of the Court of Justice or the 
Commission). They are not convinced that crime that ignores borders can only 
be dealt with by a European police force. That would only make sense if there 
were a European state with one government and one parliament with real control 
over police organisations. In its absence, there is a risk of those organisations 
becoming autonomous. As they explain in interviews, enlargement increases the 
risk of an autonomous organisation given that the means of control and lines of 
appeal are currently so dispersed. The danger is that Europol will determine the 
norms of international police co-operation at European level according to its 
own interests and infighting. Nevertheless, in the opinion of many police 
officers, institutional co-operation should concentrate more on judicial matters 
than on police co-operation, because this forms the basis for any criminal police 
co-operation.
4. Institutional Co-operation: the Normative Path to Europeanisation
Institutional co-operation with CEECs in police matters is only just beginning. 
The pre-accession pact on organised crime was one of the first documents to 
bring them to the negotiating table (European Union 8331/98 Council 
CRIMORG 72 version 19/05/98). But the conditions of this “pact” are difficult 
to realise and it is not certain whether convergence will go beyond judicial 
agreement to the homogenisation of practices or whether it will remain a simple 
formality. This issue is often overlooked and the only concern seems to be the 
timely signing of an agreement. The Commission (and the Council) seem to be 
mostly interested in the normative aspect. The signing of conventions and texts 
is regarded as a political guarantee, a sign of goodwill on behalf of future 
members. There is little concern, at least officially, over whether the 
transformations are effectively carried out. The debate is essentially a legal one. 
But can it remain so?
-  The conditions of pre-admission impose at least six criteria that CEECs 
need to fulfil on organised crime: (1) an efficiently structured police 
organisation with all necessary powers; (2) qualified personnel and technical 
equipment needed to combat crime; (3) an appropriate legal system and 
sufficient legal grounding; (4) practical capacity of the relevant services to fight 
crime and prevent drug addiction; (5) rigorous gun legislation; and (6) infallible 




























































































criteria that would make them models of behaviour even in comparison to 
established democracies. In so doing, EU members assume that the problems of 
transition and of adapting the police forces and various security agencies have 
already been solved.
But is this reasonable? It is not the purpose of this paper to analyse the 
processes at work in the transformation of the social practices of bureaucracies 
anymore than it is to study the relations of these police forces with the different 
sectors of their societies (Jobard). More research should be done on this subject 
in relation to the “models” proposed by western governments.
The behaviour of police forces in democracies are not as transparent as we 
would like to believe. What are the real practices of security agencies in 
democracies and how can efficient crime prevention and necessary freedoms be 
reconciled? What importance do security agents give to the notion of liberty 
when it clashes with the quest for efficiency? What can be said of the proposed 
norms when examining the social practices of western countries? To what extent 
are norms respected concerning the professional code of ethics, non-invasion of 
privacy, the presumption of innocence, the preference for law against illegal 
efficiency? Do they lead to different practices or are they the basis of a more 
elaborate system of justification?
The co-operation provided for by the pre-accession pact on the prevention 
of organised crime brings together the various recommendations of G7/G8 and 
requires the CEECs to adhere to them. But EU countries themselves find it 
difficult to transform these recommendations into actual practices. How far 
should the CEECs be held responsible for the application of these 
recommendations? The paradox is that by demanding too much of them, the EU 
may end up demanding nothing at all, as it will be satisfied simply with formal 
assent; the actual application will scarcely be looked into. Isn’t that what already 
happens within the EU before enlargement?
In demanding more information exchange, more reliable organisations 
and better technical competence, EU countries show that their idea of co­
operation is that CEECs need to pull themselves up to EU standards. This 
imbalance casts a shadow on the idea of the reciprocity of information 
exchange.
The ambiguity of relations between CEEC and western police forces lies 
in the fact that the latter want to give CEEC officers advice and advocate co­
operation but at the same time they are reluctant to put their trust in them and are 
not prepared to work on a reciprocal basis. The advice given becomes a form of 




























































































scope for innovations or initiatives of their own, even ones that might reflect 
their specificity, and their democratic capacity is measured by how well they 
adapt to the model imposed upon them. Co-operation is transformed into an 
unequal relationship in which they are expected to obey. This is not well 
received. Even if CEECs recognise their own weaknesses, they are not 
impressed by the strengths of western European countries and are not prepared 
to follow their lead. The American model often seems more coherent and less 
“hypocritical” than those from the EU.
US agents have long experience of non-colonial but non-reciprocal 
relations (US-Mexico or US-Colombia) and they play that game quite well. This 
is not the case of EU police forces with regard to CEECs. Heads of security 
agencies in EU countries complain of the possible discrepancy between police 
practices (in terms of both efficiency and the protection of basic rights) and the 
texts signed by the political leaders of the countries in question. In their view, 
European diplomats and lawyers do not have sufficient understanding of the 
subject and are too formalistic; failing to ensure that the CEECs have the means 
to implement the texts. They often cite the example of the complex relationship 
between the United States and Central America to highlight the problem of the 
attainable level of confidence between EU and future member police forces. 
Some officers believe that co-operation is good and getting better all the time. 
However others, speaking off the record, bring up the issue of CEEC police 
access to sensitive data (particularly in relation to the development of Europol), 
their role in Schengen and the dangers of infiltration by criminal networks. For 
their part, the CEEC police forces are extremely sensitive about this subject and 
concerned for their reputation, which explains the kind of diplomatic double-talk 
that avoids the issues most hotly debated by the people concerned. But this 
“question of confidence” must be posed.
Although some reject the strong institutionalisation of police co­
operation, there is rarely any opposition to European institutional co-operation 
in legal matters. Penal co-operation is an essential element of police co­
operation and mainly achieved through the institutions. It would be difficult to 
work together without some common penal qualification of organised crime or 
other offences. But despite their efforts, EU members have not been able, or 
have not wanted, to agree on a common definition and so make up for this 
lacuna by quoting all the appended texts that condemn acts under the general 
heading of criminality. Terms such as organised or serious form of criminality (a 
formula that includes both organised and non-organised crime) are symptomatic 
of their indecision. This state of affairs is unsatisfactory and there have been 
many calls for a uniform definition of crime. The problem with this, however, is 
that legal harmonisation would ignore the heterogeneity of the social practices 




























































































costs could lead to a distorted view of the phenomenon itself if the overriding 
ambition is to unify what is, in fact, heterogeneous. After the question of mutual 
trust in operational co-operation, this is perhaps one of the most important issues 
at stake in the process and needs to be examined. Enlargement leads to texts 
that, in an attempt at synthesis and consensus, become more and more general 
and less and less in touch with social practices. The building of unity by means 
of the fairly artificial creation of a convergence of threats or o f a new enemy is a 
process that needs to be carefully studied (LeveaU in KASTORIANO 1998, Dal 
Lago 1998).
By including the issue of Schengen and its acquis, Amsterdam 
institutional co-operation has renewed some of the ambiguity of Maastricht and 
has re-established a link between police co-operation, migration flows and 
border issues. The inclusion of Schengen has made matters even more 
complicated (if possible) than they were under Maastricht, despite the fact that 
its very objective was to clarify and simplify the relationship between the pillars. 
Disagreements over the legally constraining nature of the decisions and over the 
distribution of the various acquis means that after Amsterdam, for important 
points of regulation of practices, the Schengen acquis remain within the third 
pillar. Thus the pessimistic hypothesis about the Treaty of Amsterdam is likely 
to be confirmed (Bigo in de la Serre and Lesquesne 1998). Police and 
judicial co-operation will continue to depend upon a vision that wrongly links 
crime and migration. It will be based more on dealing with the fears and worries 
of western countries than on the identification of crime problems.
The move towards more solidarity and integration among member 
countries inherent in the first pillar will be undermined by the spirit of distrust in 
the third. This is not because of crime itself, but because it will be imported into 
the first pillar through the domains of migration and transborder flows. 
Institutional co-operation with CEECs will only be judged relevant if it 
corresponds to the unspoken elements of western policy on migration, and under 
the cover of arguments for the prevention of organised crime.
But what exactly are we trying to solve, and by what means? These are 
two essential issues at stake in enlargement that force current EU members to 
examine their own practices.
In this second part I will pose several questions on the complex interplay 
of the norms we suggest, the norms we follow, the practices we adopt, the myths 
we propagate and what effects of reception, reproduction and resistance these 
might entail. As before, I will avoid entering into a theoretical discussion of the 




























































































power and resistance, importation or hybridisation, etc. I will simply identify 
different levels of problems and different ways of posing the problem.
II. Organised Crime: the Main Focus of Co-operation with CEECs?
Is the “question” of organised crime and the “response” to it at the heart of the 
relationship between western and CEEC police forces? Practically every agent 
in the field of security automatically thinks so; their vision is organised that way. 
They think there is a threatening reality that must be combated by the 
development of state co-ordinated public policy. I have already questioned the 
way this problem is formulated and the assumptions that it makes (BlGO in 
JOPPKE and GUIRAUDON, forthcoming). Security agencies do not simply respond 
to threats, they take part in creating them by objectifying them in their routine 
work, in the way they put their statistics together, in the hierarchy given to 
different dangers, in the priorities they set, in the technical solutions available, in 
the know-how they think they possess.
I do not share the view of some experts who believe that organised crime 
can be intrinsically defined as a social reality “independent” of the security field, 
whose sole origin lies in the practices of “underworld” actors. But, even if this 
were true, it is too simplistic to think that tighter border control, with the use of 
technology and the military, will stop it. It is more appropriate to co-ordinate 
intelligence and to infiltrate. So why do so many agents support the first 
solution? To what extent is concern over organised crime useful to certain 
services (in terms of missions and budgets) or politicians (dealing with fears 
over difference, immigrants, foreigners)? It can, for instance, be seen as one way 
of furthering technology, to the advantage of a few private and quasi-public 
companies. Aren’t the fears of citizens and their representatives strengthened by 
exaggerating the dangers?
The answer depends on one’s view of whether organised crime is highly 
transnational or not. Does it operate on a transborder scale within a limited area, 
or does it operate on a continent-wide scale? American intelligence service 
discourse tends to speak of global terrorism, global mafia and transnational 
organised crime (TOC), but there is little concrete evidence of this and European 
police forces doubt that there is such a degree of organisation. Of course, there 
are local forms of organised crime, such as the Sicilian Mafia, Neapolitan 
Camorra, or Japanese Triads, but the connections between them are weak. 
Furthermore, the response to them also depends on the belief that the most 
dangerous and sophisticated mafia organisations use the police’s own 
undercover methods against them and manage to infiltrate the police and local or 




























































































seeing in their adversaries the very characteristics that they would like to possess 
themselves?
1. Beliefs on the Origins of Organised Crime
The image of a mafia that has invaded Russian political circles and then spread 
to CEECs remains one of the most potent images portrayed by politicians, 
journalists and a minority of security agents (usually those furthest from the 
field or working in different specialised sectors). This image nevertheless forms 
the basis for the main argument in security debates and it combines with or 
replaces fears over migration flows from Russia. Yet associating the Russian 
polity with organised crime in this way is a complex matter (Favarel).
There are criminal activities in Russia, and their extent is all the more 
surprising since communist propaganda deliberately played down criminality to 
make us believe in the virtues of socialism. However, these activities are 
concentrated within Russian territory and their exportation is far from proven. 
Even if true, it would be in no way peculiar to Russia. Thus although there are 
suspicions of money laundering, ties with tax havens, with the US and with 
Germany, the activities of the Russian mafia outside its territory are probably 
fairly limited. In France, enquiries carried out by criminal investigations police 
have shown that French territory serves as a holiday resort for Russian 
“nouveaux riches” but that mafia activity is virtually non-existent and is a 
product of journalistic imagination in search of an exciting subject (interviews).
In Germany and Belgium there are more concrete signs of infiltration, but 
they remain fairly limited, too. It would also be an exaggeration to say that the 
Polish or Hungarian mafia are a conduit for the Russian mafia. Once again, a 
particular phenomenon (in this case, the trafficking of stolen cars between 1992- 
1995) has been extrapolated to establish a theory of a global mafia linking 
criminal milieus. Since 1996, following the setting up of car assembly plants in 
Russia which cater to the needs of rich Russians, there has been a fall in the 
traffic of stolen cars. But once ideas on global mafia have been formed, they are 
self-perpetuating through the “simple rationalisation” of events often based upon 
conspiracy theories creating an invisible, and all-powerful adversary (AFSP 
round table on the enemy within).
Like EU countries, CEECs have problems with criminality and significant 
problems linked to structural transformations in the economy and the labour 
market, but they are not a conduit for Russian criminality and should not be seen 
as threatening an invasion of western countries through crime and/or 
immigration. Yet this is how they are viewed by a significant fringe of those in 




























































































would keep western countries from coming into contact with the dangers of the 
East. Ideas are forming on the need to “hold” and “control” borders in the name 
of sovereignty or the safeguarding of national identity. The image of a fortress 
or an electronic wall is valued as a protection against an “invasion” seen as 
either “massive” (people fleeing war or repression) or “creeping” (illegal or 
even legal migration which is seen as a threat if migrants refuse give up certain 
values from the old country) (Bigo in Rea 1997). Such security ideas and 
debates have been increasingly criticised but their symbolic effect has not been 
reduced (see the issue of Cultures & Conflits: “Sécurité et Immigration” 1998). 
This forms the basis for a whole series of more or less well-reasoned fears over 
CEEC entry to the EU.
Before or even while “we” criticise “them”, we need to understand and 
classify our own fears by analysing who voices them, what they are based upon, 
to what extent they influence discussions between EU members and CEECs, and 
to what extent they may affect CEEC rights.
2. Fear of Corruption in the Future Member-state Police Forces and 
Organised Crime
As was said earlier, when EU police officers are asked about their fears over 
CEECs, they all mention corruption and the infiltration of CEEC police forces 
by the mafia. What western security agencies fear is that when they work with 
CEEC police forces and give them information, that information may well end 
up in the hands of mafia organisations. Their suspicions are confirmed by the 
fact that when CEE states or organisations are accused of such practices, their 
reaction is to defend their own case whilst giving credit to the general theory of 
overall corruption by accusing the other services or CEECs (interviews).
There are many reasons given to explain the corruption: lack of finance, 
late payment of salaries in certain countries, new habits of capitalism where 
everything can be bought, the weak notion of public service wrongly associated 
with socialism. The “weakness of the state” and public regulations, and even 
mafia control of central political power (in other countries) are also used to 
explain infiltration.
This lack of trust and solidarity among CEECs affects their international 
credibility and increases western distrust. That is why one of the Commission’s 
priorities must be to create the conditions of mutual trust that are currently 
lacking. This would entail an energetic fight against presenting security issues in 




























































































Of course, the situation differs from one country to another. There is a 
correlation between those countries that are the first in line to be admitted (with 
the exception of Cyprus), and those with the least risk of conflict with 
minorities, political upheaval, migration flows, organised crime, or terrorism.
Poland has made some effort to improve the credibility of its security 
forces, as have the Czech Republic and more recently, Hungary. Slovenia has 
also made an effort in wanting to show that it is already prepared for Schengen. 
Various countries have emphasized their techniques and repackaged the image 
of their police force, calling upon specialists in image creation from the private 
sector. Criminal investigations police have distanced themselves from the 
intelligence services and former militia by pointing out how little they were 
involved in the former regimes. Services specialised in narcotics claim to be a 
new generation of police officers, trained in modern investigation methods, very 
often after a course in the United States. The language of policing has changed 
and adapted to western models: community policing, proactive methods, 
sophisticated surveillance technology in ports and airports. Acceptance of 
western technology is often seen as a sign of modernisation and hence 
democracy, although the correlation is highly questionable.
CEEC governments will have to impose visa requirements for certain 
countries and take restrictive measures against illegal immigration from outside 
the community. They will need to be equipped with the IT needed for SIS and 
have legislation in place on data protection. However, despite what agents from 
the security field may claim, such measures will not necessarily have an impact 
upon their behaviour towards minorities and migrants. Technology and 
democracy do not always go hand in hand. If CEEC intelligence services have 
access to SIS, which already has over 8 million entries and will soon reach 14 
million, will it be used for other ends than those intended? Certain NGOs have 
already signalled their unease (ECRE, European Parliament report, Statewatch).
How will anyone check how strict or lax controls of migrants from 
outside the community are, or how effective the detection of false documents is? 
CEEC police forces will be judged by western security agencies, by 
governments and by NGOs. Their opinions will differ. They will be open to 
accusations of being both lax and arbitrary. One side is worried about the 
possible ill-treatment of minorities and of asylum seekers from outside the 
community. The other side wonders just how far they can trust badly paid police 
officers who may be bought off by smugglers. At the same time, lawyers and 
diplomats argue that the new governments must be trusted to manage their 
police forces. A lack of trust would lead to a politically untenable situation of 




























































































western countries would be to observe, control or even direct as much as to 
advise.
Furthermore, the fixing of efficiency standards assumes that all countries, 
both CEECs and current members, will adhere to them. But are they prepared to 
do so? Would we accept having our own police forces inspected by foreign 
governments and forces? Countries like the United Kingdom (or France) that 
adopt an intergovernmental approach will surely refuse, and once the CEECs 
have joined the EU it seems likely that they will reinforce an intergovernmental 
stance on police matters. They do not appear to favour a Europol that is either 
too powerful, too German or too interfering.
3. Fear of the Migration Invasion, Schengen, and the Moving of the Union’s 
“External” Border
As Malcolm Anderson points out, borders are complex institutions and any 
alteration necessarily carries certain consequences. Borders are identity markers, 
a means of protection, junction points, solidarity boundaries, and demarcations 
of competence and the power to sanction (Anderson Frontiers 1997). As long 
as borders demarcate the nation state, these different functions more or less 
coincide. However, given the current distinction between the EU’s internal and 
external borders and the decoupling of territorial and identity controls, our frame 
of reference needs to be changed. How can we manage the protection of territory 
in a world without “borders”? As the role of external security linked to the risk 
of conventional war in Europe declined, the role of internal security was revived 
by playing on fears of loss of national identities through large-scale immigration 
and population movements. There was talk of insufficient security and people’s 
fears hinged upon links between immigration, crime, political violence, 
unemployment and deficits in social welfare.
I have explained in detail how this continuum of threats to security is put 
together and how it shapes a vision of a world that is threatened from without 
and within by highlighting transnational phenomena, e.g., violence from the 
Middle East, drugs rings, modern slave-trade, illegal immigration, refugees 
fleeing political persecution or war. This (in)security continuum has gradually 
forged a link between security and migration (even asylum) which works on 
three levels. On an ideological level there has been a marked decline in the idea 
that there is a contradiction between security and liberty. This notion has been 
replaced by a conviction that security guarantees liberty. On a normative level 
the creation of statistical instruments and laws and regulations link the two 
phenomena. On an instrumental level each country puts policies in place in the 





























































































The original idea of a state delimited by EU borders with a uniform 
regime of external (increased control) and internal relations (freedom of 
movement) soon gave way to a series of complex relations between the different 
member countries. Some, such as the UK or Ireland, oppose any change. Others 
will only accept change if there is some form of compensation. None interpret 
the safety clauses in the same way (Schengen countries, French attitude). Over 
the years Schengen has done more to shape the debate on the justification of 
controls than it has to establish freedom of movement. It has been much less a 
laboratory for the idea of a community of European citizens than a source of 
opposition to it. It has short-circuited the Commission by quickly developing a 
rationale of surveillance and control which limits freedom of movement in 
practice. The idea behind Schengen is to make border control coincide with the 
deployment of migration flow police made up, in the absence of fédéralisation, 
of co-operating national police forces from all member states. Yet there is still a 
myth of Schengen as the laboratory of the EU and as the bearer of the values of 
freedom of movement which makes it difficult to uncover these strategies of 
control.
Enlargement now alters the balance of relations between the geography of 
the external border and its function, strongly advocated by some governments, 
as a barrier to migration flows. This poses a serious problem for those behind 
the creation of Schengen.
The first consequence of EU enlargement for internal security matters lies 
in the change in the geographical area and in the people to be monitored and 
controlled. Theoretically, as members of the community, CEEC citizens will no 
longer be the object of any particular surveillance and will be free, not only in 
their movements, but will also, under certain conditions, be able to settle in 
countries which currently protect themselves from migration flows from these 
very countries. This should make controls much easier as the new borders 
further to the East are currently far less active. Intra-community flows will 
greatly outweigh flows at the community’s periphery.
This tendency will be reinforced once Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus have been integrated. If the priority is 
freedom of movement and the creation of solidarity among European countries, 
then the situation calls for some rejoicing. If, on the other hand, the idea (hidden 
behind Schengen) is to protect prosperous countries from flows from poorer 
countries and to create common policy in immigration countries towards 
emigration countries, enlargement will profoundly alter the balance of relations. 





























































































The external border will no longer correspond to migration concerns. It 
will continue to function with respect to flows from further afield, i.e., Asia, 
Africa, etc., but because it will have moved further to the east it will be 
ineffectual in relation to the economies of western Europe. Western countries 
can react in two ways. They can accept this state of affairs and clearly favour 
migration within the EU. On the other hand, they can reinstate controls on 
internal borders, or at least on borders with emigration countries, which is what 
the CEECs are likely to remain for some years to come despite the changes 
currently taking place. This would have to be done under the pretext of a special 
exemption to avoid questions being raised about the historical (and colonial) ties 
with countries south of the Mediterranean.
Although Germany would be little affected by this evolution, the same 
cannot be said for France and the United Kingdom. Unlike Germany’s intra­
community ties, their strongest ties will continue to be with countries outside the 
community. Relations with the east and south will change, as will relations 
between Germany and its partners.
4. Immigration and Emigration Countries within One Area?
Although one might hope that a strong spirit of integration within the EU would 
help CEECs by giving their citizens rights and guarantees on movement and 
settlement that they otherwise would not have had, it seems that a lot of political 
parties, including some in power, as well as security agencies have a tendency to 
link migration from CEECs to organised crime. Such criminal activities include 
trafficking in works of art, stolen cars, prostitution, the heroin trade in the 
Balkans, as well as money laundering and mafia activity linked to Russian 
capitalism. Those who make that link call for greater internal control within the 
EU directed towards CEEC citizens.
Although it is seldom brought to the fore, such a (unofficial) view is 
common among security agencies and has become one of their points of 
reference. It explains security agents’ misgivings about the rationale behind 
“Europe” and more particularly about the power of the Court of Justice to 
actually assess their actions. What is at stake is not so much an issue of 
sovereignty as an unwillingness to exercise transparency or explain motives 
hidden behind the reason of state. The contradiction between the logic behind 
the first pillar (economy, integration, citizenship) and the third (security and 





























































































Police officers in the field support the idea of a return to tighter national 
controls, which in practice would be at odds with freedom of movement, not 
because of organised crime but because of immigration. Others see the solution 
in a reinforced informal Schengen where immigration countries would co­
operate against emigration countries within the official Schengen. This would 
create the famous buffer zone and a system in which the entry of CEECs would 
be no guarantee of freedom of movement for their citizens.
There is no shortage of reasons, both good and bad, for setting up a 
system that will alter the regime of controls, thus ‘abandoning the Schengen 
discourse which justifies the tightening of controls at external borders by 
abolishing controls on internal borders’. Such a system would be comprised of a 
series of sluice-gates with various levels of border control according to a 
country’s prosperity. External borders would be maintained and even tightened, 
with the help of western technology and using personnel with the military know­
how that CEEC security agents exercised in former times. At no stage, however, 
would there be any compensation in the form of freedom of movement.
This is all the more important given that the EU’s final border has not yet 
been traced and the first wave of new entrants will shape future relations with 
the ones that follow. The reasoning that Romania or Ukraine will enter under the 
same conditions as Poland creates new fears. There is talk of the risk of internal 
conflict in these countries due to their problems with minorities once they join 
the EU (Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania, Roma and ethnic 
Albanians in the Balkans, cf. Bort). Freedom of movement will have had its 
day. It will apply to some sections of the Union’s membership but not to others. 
How should we react to this argument which destroy the European idea? Can we 
accept a division of an enlarged EU into two zones, one with freedom of 
movement and one without ?
5. Transformation of CEECs and the Hypothesis of Sluice-gates
Many diplomats hope to avoid this contradiction which plays into the hands of 
those playing the security card. They argue that distrust at official level based on 
security fears undermines freedom of movement. They try to ignore or belittle 
the problem, despite the fact that some, albeit marginal, politicians have adopted 
this discourse as their own. According to diplomats, the very nature of migration 
flows from CEECs is changing, so the situation is only transitory. Provided that 
CEECs manage, through economic development, to keep their populations at 
home, they will soon become immigration countries rather than emigration 
countries and our concerns over migration will focus on the external border. In 
future the problem will be more one of transit across their territory rather than 




























































































Recent trends highlighted in official reports are encouraging. We are far 
from the apocalyptic predictions of the Berlin Conference of 1994, and although 
it continues to be a point of reference for G8 and the European Council, 
sociological descriptions have shown that migration tends to fluctuate. 
Transborder crossings are principally a form of commercial tourism to supply 
the local transborder economy (cf. fourth meeting report, see also European 
Parliament libe-104, civil liberties, Migration and asylum in central and eastern 
Europe). Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to assume that the current flow 
from CEECs to western countries will not dry up upon their entry into the EU.
In that case, the European Union would form an area with enormous 
differences in economic development and a preference for “internal” migration 
over migration from outside. Its rationale would resemble NAFTA and this 
would again raise questions on the issue of freedom of movement for individuals 
within this area.
6. Militarisation of External Borders Through Technology: Not a Solution.
The issues at stake in the militarisation of borders, with the increasing 
intervention of armed forces in the control of transnational population flows, 
have been studied in some depth. The research focuses on a comparative 
analysis of the situations in America at the Mexican border, in Germany at the 
Polish border, in Austria at the Hungarian border, and in Italy at the Straits of 
Otranto. It also covers armed forces participation in domestic operations such as 
the Vigipirate operation in France which has been in place since 1995, various 
anti-mafia operations in Italy (the most famous being Vespri Siciliani), and the 
Northern Ireland situation in the United Kingdom.
The stakes involved concern the use of the most sophisticated technology 
(helicopters, radar, night vision, video surveillance, heat detectors, 
telecommunications tapping, high speed intervention vehicles), personnel 
training, and the relationship between the army, “mixed” forces and the police. 
They also concern issues of freedom and democracy as they undermine the 
principle of non-intervention of the military in domestic civilian life. These 
points are outside the scope of this paper (Direction des Affaires Stratégiques 
report 1999, Bigo, TSOUKALA, Hanon, La participation des militaires aux 
questions de sécurité intérieure).
Suffice it to note that Poland is already on its way to militarising its 
borders and the head of border control clearly entertains the possibility of using 
available military equipment to secure the eastern border as it is impossible to 
do so by more traditional means. Furthermore, Poland has called for American 




























































































surveillance, etc.)- Hungary is also interested provided the United States can 
give them technical assistance and Slovenia has approached commercial 
companies to supply the necessary equipment. Even Estonia is considering such 
action, although such a move certainly would not ease their relations with 
Russia. As for Cyprus, it plans to increase its forces, not as a defence against 
Turkish invasion, but to fight against traffickers and illegal immigration.
The militarisation of borders through the intense use of warfare 
technology redeployed in the surveillance of transborder flows is seen by many 
professionals as the solution to the problem. In fact militarisation creates more 
problems than it solves. It is very expensive for public coffers even if it does 
bring returns for private companies. It creates arbitrary situations in certain 
enclosed areas such as airports, ports, and certain border crossing-points. 
However, it cannot manage and control all unauthorised crossing-points and 
therefore does not provide effective protection. Determined individuals will 
continue to cross borders if they want to. Land borders cannot be closed off in 
their “green zone” without an unacceptable increase in personnel costs. 
Militarisation also leads to further confusion in distinguishing between migrant 
and enemy and can encourage fragile democracies to slip back into authoritarian 
habits. After the rapid demilitarisation of borders, we could be insidiously 
sliding towards remilitarisation involving the same people but with different 
uniforms. That could have serious consequences in terms of infringements of 
human rights for those from outside the community. Under what conditions will 
people be turned back at the eastern borders in Poland or Slovenia and what 
rights will asylum seekers have? It is not necessarily a good idea to direct the 
armed forces of these countries towards internal issues and border protection. It 
would be better to train police forces to have greater respect for human rights. 
Militarisation also encourages countries with powerful NGOs to transfer 
external border management onto their neighbours thus avoiding any internal 
protest. We have called this remote policing or remote security control (Bigo in 
Rea 1998).
CEEC police officers in the field get the impression that they are being 
forced into police practices that are out of step with the discourse on democracy, 
particularly when it comes to immigration and asylum. They feel that they are 
being made to do the “dirty work” of blocking population flows at their borders. 
The recent western reaction to the Kosovo situation, with a general refusal to 
accept refugees in anything but the smallest doses, is seen as a clear sign of 
hypocrisy. The most critical among them feel that EU officers want to replace 
them in their work while imposing responsibilities upon them when serious 
problems arise. Tighter controls have already upset the bazaar economy that had 
sprung up on Poland’s eastern border and created tension with its neighbours. 




























































































the fact that they recently experienced similar problems themselves and were 
considerably more conciliatory towards the Poles than they expect the Poles to 
be towards their eastern neighbours, particularly Ukraine. There are signs of 
disillusionment in the interviews. Police officers have realised that this is the 
price they have to pay if they want to join the EU. Membership is desired for 
economic reasons but enthusiasm for EU values has waned. Those currently 
engaged in the process of joining the EU are already thinking about future 
enlargement and are adopting the same strategies with the future members, their 
territorial neighbours to the east and south-east.
7. CEECs and the Right to Freedom of Movement
The right of European citizens and legal residents to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the EU is one of the most important assets of EU 
democracy. At the normative level, this right cannot be undermined by the 
creation of second-class citizens in Eastern Europe without seriously damaging 
the principles of the EU and creating significant resentment. But is it possible to 
implement this right in the short-term? The debate centres around the core 
values we want and their practical possibilities.
For people who believe in human rights, EU enlargement can only 
proceed if all citizens of the future Union are treated equally. This means that 
article 62 will apply to all citizens and that there will be no control of 
individuals crossing internal borders.
European solidarity is weakened by the increase in alarmist discourse, be 
it official or unofficial, on the risks that current members run in letting CEECs 
join in the near future. Controls within the Schengen area between immigration 
and emigration countries are justified on the grounds of a “migration risk” or the 
risk of “organised crime”.
Migration flows are not themselves directly correlated to security or 
danger nor is it possible to block them with a system of border controls. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to require more of CEEC partners in terms of 
control, security and democratic transparency than is current practice within the 
EU. They cannot be expected to apply the norms laid down by the European 
institutions to the letter, especially if current member-states like the UK or 
others, often do little to apply them themselves (see various practices in border 
and other forms of control that currently undermine the everyday reality of 
freedom of movement within the Schengen area).
The principle of the right to freedom of movement for all future EU 




























































































fears are often the product of over-generalisations based upon concrete examples 
that, although exact, are statistically insignificant. Media interest generates 
belief in their importance and creates greatly disproportionate distrust of 
foreigners or of those perceived as foreign. It is humiliating for those who are 
permanently suspected of being potential criminals simply because of their 
nationality or the colour of their skin (see Fourth meeting report).
The image of the EU depends on the myths that it can project outside its 
territory to promote its values. It cannot claim to be the cradle of democracy, the 
place to settle, and at the same time create strictly internal myths to strengthen 
unity in the face of an imaginary enemy. It is typical of the profound naivety of 
certain leaders’ short-sighted cynicism to believe that the security myth will not 
affect the image of democracy both outside and within the EU.
Given the changing notions of state, sovereignty, identity, border and 
security, linked to transnationalisation and the age of risk, it is illusory to 
continue to function according to an internal-external diptych. They are not two 
separate worlds and an action in one will have repercussions in the other. 
Security issues are affected by the blurring of the differentiation between 
internal and external.
Conclusion
In conclusion, to give the European project a renewed positive image, we must 
put as much energy as possible into fighting the negative images and 
disproportionate fears that drive co-operation policies. The new members must 
be given equal rights. More specifically we must make sure that the right to 
freedom of movement is effectively implemented. A useful initiative would be 
to create a European committee based on a network of NGOs, national MPs and 
members of the security field, which could check on this implementation. A 
monitoring body should be set up to identify the problems encountered and the 
obstacles placed in the way of freedom of movement.
Didier BlGO 
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